


Uirqunia RECORD

SEASON'S

ecember 1961 35 Cents



Architect's sketch of new post office, Providence, Rhode Island. Architect-Engineer: Charles A. Maguire & Associates, Providence, Rhode Island.

First mechanized post office...

concrete domed shells provide 420' x 300' area with just two interior column groupings

A mechanized post office at Providence, R. I., is first step in a postal modernization program that will eventually provide "next-day" delivery anywhere in the U.S.

Six intersecting concrete shells form the multiple domed roof. Two four-column groups provide the only interior support. This permits unobstructed floor space essential to the electronically controlled mail-flow layout and allows the flexibility required for experimental spotting and rearrangement of machines. Another benefit of a shell roof was to eliminate exterior buttresses of conventional arch construction which would interfere with outside truck traffic.


A concrete weighing 110 lb. per cu. ft. with a 2-inch slump and seven-day strength of 4,000 psi was used. Aggregate consisted of sand in combination with expanded shale. An air-entraining agent was added.

For design data on barrel shells and on standard, skewed, groined and sloping hyperbolic paraboloids, write for free literature. (U.S. and Canada only.)

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Falsework consisted of two identical sets of timber truss framing. 6"-thick shells each required 800 cu. yds. of concrete, placed in two operations. Spanning 150 x 140 ft., shells are separated by 2-in. expansion joints.



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VOLUME LXXXIII

DECEMBER 1961

NUMBER TWELVE

"How The Union Was Reunited With The Confederacy"

A GENTLEMAN who calls himself Colonel Beauregard Horsepasture has made, just when all hope seemed lost, a fresh contribution to the Centennial and the study of the Civil War. This one who calls himself Colonel Horsepasture (and, for all I know, this might be his square moniker) has published a small guide book. The back cover displays a Confederate Recruiting Poster: JOIN NOW And See The NAWTH. An inside spread shows an artist's concept of the entrance into Virginia, which begins with an Immigration Office. Prominent in the foreground are factories producing "genuine Civil War rifle bullets" and "genuwine antiques;" farther along, near a Beauregard Johnson's restaurant and a bulldozer producing "genuine Civil War trenches," a large road sign atop a souvenir store proclaims: KEEP DIXIE GREEN: Bring Money.


However, it is Colonel Horsepasture's interpretation of the war that brings new light to illuminate the musty areas in which Southern historians have so long toiled under the oppressive burden of facts. In a listing of the battles of the war, there is "Gen'l Shumman's Retreat Through Gawga," a fine capsule account of Gettysburg under the subtitle, "Final Results Not In," and the fairest summary ever presented for *Appomattox Coat House*. "We had been chasing Yankees up and down Dixie for several years. Frankly, we was tired. So, when Gen'l Grant asked if the Yankees could join up with the South again, GEN'L LEE told him he could." Beauregard's namesake follows this theme in a listing of Southern holidays: End of Wah Day is explained as "Day Union was Reunited with Confederacy."

This new line of historical interpretation pioneered by the Colonel represents a giant step forward, as measured by national standards. As mentioned before in these columns, for generations Northern versions of American history have been taught non-Southern school-children—and Southern too, for that matter. Every school in Virginia celebrates Thanksgiving as a Pilgrim innovation, when the facts indisputably prove the first Thanksgiving in this country to have been observed at Berkeley Plantation in 1619, before the Pilgrims even left England. But the Northern presentation of history is not bounded by fact.

Northerners do not dispute the fact that the first permanent English settlement founded in America was at Jamestown in 1607: they ignore it. They have talked so consistently about the Mayflower and Plymouth Rock as to make them, in the public mind, synonymous with the founding of the United States.

Recently in Wisconsin, I listened to a superior baccalaureate address by the learned, personable dean of the divinity school at the University of Chicago. In talking about the meaning of "one country under God," Dean Brauer mentioned, with the casualness of referring to a well-known truth, the religious spirit brought to these shores by—who else?—the Pilgrims. As a matter of fact, the bringing of the Church of England to this continent was a primary purpose in the founding of Jamestown, and the growth of the Church in Virginia was inextricably intertwined with the development of the Colony. Yet, the witch-burning Pilgrims, a lunatic fringe of dissenters who, in turn, drove dissenters from their colonies in the most bitter spirit of intolerance, have been palmed off as the zealous who

(Continued on page 17)



An ancient woodcut depicting the Adoration of the Magi by the artist Albrecht Durer (1471-1528), now in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D. C. (Use of photograph by courtesy National Gallery of Art.)



PAGE FOUR

VIRGINIA RECORD

Founded 1878

The Epicurean Delights of Christmas

By GERARD TETLEY



How bless'd, how envied were our life
Could we but 'scape the poulterer's knife
But man, curs'd man on turkeys preys

And Christmas shortens all our days

Sometimes with oysters we combine Sometimes assist the savory chine From low peasant to the lord The turkey smokes on every board.





I T WOULD BE HARD TO FIND at this season of the year many people inclined to condone the dolorous complaint of the famous social satirist of the Sixteenth Century who wrote so disparagingly of the epicurean delights which we associate with Christmas.

To eliminate the festive bakemeats from its observance would cut heavily into the expansive feeling which helps to make Yuletide what it is.

History does not tell us clearly at what period gastronomics began to be associated with the festive day. Folklore is responsible for what little we know about its beginnings. Early in the Christian era, and possibly before, they were baking strange cakes in Estonia at

Christmas time. They were horn-shaped, with the ends turned up resembling the crib which is associated with the birth of our Lord. The cakes, however, were not eaten but were kept intact until New Year's Day when they were broken up and scattered on the land and given to the cattle to promote fecundity—a slender tracing line to the spirit of Astarte, a pre-Christian goddess of the Mediterranean area.

Authentic chapters from the days when knights were bold and barons were austere bring abundant proof of the role which eating played in the celebration of Christmas. The revelry lasted two weeks or more in England and on the continent—revelry marked

by incessant feasting when the feudal chieftain held forth in no uncertain way—possibly the source of John Gay's inspiration.

Chief among the Christmas dishes in the baronial hall was the boar's head which, at the Christmas feast was brought into the vaulted refectory with pomp and panoply and trumpets. It lay in a gold or silver salver and was greeted by a burst of Latin song

> Caput apri defero Reddens laudes domino.

Roast peacock was another mediaeval Christmas dish, considered food for lovers. It was brought into the dining (Continued on next page)



The kitchen goes to work for Christmas

hall "with virgins sweetly caroling," also the capering jester. It was usually the masterpiece of the kitchen squad and was served up "with roguish mustard." Culinary ability was put to no sterner task than the preparation of Argus, as the peacock was listed. The bird was first skinned delicately so as to preserve its radiant plumage. Then it was roasted and cooled, after which it was again cased in its original feathers with the beak gilded.

Christmas eating at times moved over into the echelon of the gourmands, for emerging from the distant past is the copy of a Christmas dinner which was served in one of England's castles. This, again, was in a day when the baronial lord unbent to honor his menials and to invite a large host of friends for a repast which took hours to serve. This is what the menu provided on that particular challenge to the digestive tract:

Oysters A collar of brawn Stewed broth of mutton marrow

A grand sallet

A potage of caponets

A breast of veal in stoffado

A boil'd partridge

A chine of beef or sirloin roast

Minced pies

A jegote of mutton and anchovy sauce

A made dish of sweetbread

A swan roast

A patty of venison

A kid with a pudding in its belly

A steak pie

A haunch of venison roasted

A turkey roast and stuck with cloves

A made dish of chicken in puff paste

Two bran geese, one roasted, one larded



A cook of the Old South

Two large capons, one larded A custard

But there were other dishes associated particularly with Christmas, as for example roast pheasants "drenched with ambergris," pies of carp's tongues.

However, even this very formidable gastronomic feat pales into insignificance when we contemplate the feast which was served in England in the year 1467 when Archbishop Neville of York was consecrated at Christmas time to what, history tells us, was more than 6,000 people. This is what the culinary impresario had to cope with on that gargantuan occasion: 300 quarters of wheat, 300 tuns of ale, 100 tuns of wine, 1 pipe of hippocras (a cordial made of spices wine), 104 oxen, 6 wild bulls, 1,000 sheep, 304 calves, 304 "porkes", 400 swans, 2,000 geese, 1,000 capons, 2,000 pigs, 104 peacocks, over 13,500 birds, large and small. In addition, for full measure, were stags, bucks, and roes 500 or more, 1,500 hot pasties of venison, 608 pikes and breams, 12 porpoises and seals besides 13,000 dishes of jelly, cold baked tarts, hot and cold custards and "spices sugered and wafers plentie.'

While we have an inscribed record of this enormous bill of fare we are not told how long it took to prepare the festive dishes prepared for the enthronization, or who paid for it.

As to the guest list, it apparently was a general invitation to the people of Yorkshire from the peasantry to the royal blood.

When one considers the limited means of communication, bad roads and slow travel one wonders when the task of procurement began or what was the condition of the perishable foods by the time the bell rang for dinner.

The Christmas turkey as we know it today was for many years a lowly bird and did not rise to eminence on the groaning board until after the days of Cromwell. He, as a puritan, had tried vainly to "put down" Christmas, contending that there was nothing in holy writ regarding it as a feast. It was after the Restoration that the day of the turkey came into its fullness where it has remained.

The mince pie, chief among the causes of childish anguish, was known as mutton pie as early as 1596. Plum pudding made its Christmas debut as plum porridge, or pottage, and was supposed to be served before any other Christmas dish. It contained mutton and beef, raisins, currants, prunes, cloves, mace and ginger.

Harking again to the gladsome days



HE CENTER FLAW in Longstreet's presentation of his case has been obscured by the relative neglect given the second day at Gettysburg in contrast to the attention directed at the

climax of the so-called "Pickett's Charge" on the third day. It is safe to say that had there been no dramatically doomed assault on the third day, Longstreet's irrationality on the second day—the crucial day—would long since have been illuminated. But "Pickett's Charge" caught the public imagination like "Custer's Last Stand"—which was no stand at all, as the doomed men led by the glory hunter were swarmed over by the great cavalry of Crazy Horse before they knew what hit them.

Seen in perspective, the third day was an anticlimax, and Lee has been subjected to considerable criticism for ordering the fateful assault. However, the assault can be seen as "fateful" only in hindsight. At the time, on the ground, the Federals thought it inevitable that, having come so close on two days, Lee would renew the offensive on the third.

On the night after the close call on the second day, Meade held a council to consider withdrawal to avoid another attack. The Federal army had suffered fearful losses on the first two days, and no replacements were near. On the Confederate side, in consideration of the na-

tion's total chances,

Lee needed a victory. Withdrawal after an inconclusive battle in the enemy's land at that stage of the war, with their resources rapidly declining, would be sufficiently damaging to the Confederacy to influence Lee to take any reasonable risk to win a decision. Then, personally, as a general he was a fighter who played always to win, and at Gettysburg the third day still held the possibility of victory—according to the factors known to Lee.

The chief factor unknown to Lee was the mental attitude of his senior subordinate, Longstreet. The very heart of the Controversy is reached on this point. It is here Longstreet excused his self-admittedly poor performance by asserting that Lee should have put another officer in charge of the assault as "he knew that I did not believe that success was possible." If Lee did not see fit to place another officer in charge, Longstreet wrote, then, "knowing my want of confidence, he should have given the benefit of his presence and assistance in getting the troops up, posting them, and arranging the batteries.'

Now, this incredible statement suggests that, when a subordinate officer disapproved of the commanding general's plans, the commanding general should neglect the rest of the army and act as an artillery colonel in "arranging batteries" and as a field officer in posting the troops. Presumably, if Ewell and Hill disapproved simultaneously with Longstreet, Lee would move about to each corps, posting their troops and arranging their batteries (totalling about 60 at Gettysburg). In all the history of war, one can


find nothing comparable to Longstreet's suggestion that, when a subordinate disapproved, the superior should assume the subordinate's

duties.

In going to this absurd extreme to shift the blame to Lee, Longstreet revealed the extent of his own distorted thinking. Gauged off his ac-


tions at Gettysburg, he evidently was suffering there the mental disorder as indicated in his later writing about it. What is by no means evident is the degree to which he revealed his agitation and made known his "want of confidence" in the commanding general's plans.

From his statements, on the morning of July 3 he made another of his long, impassioned speeches in which he again animadverted to the strategic proposal he (Continued on page 14)



CONCLUSION

by CLIFFORD DOWDEY



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
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LETTERS

Editor Virginia Record

Dear Mr. Dowdey:

I have read with a great deal of interest your article, "The Cruelest Moment". Your historical background is wider and deeper than mine, but our thinking is quite closely parallel.

It seems to me significant that the areas where once the great empires of antiquity flourished are now inhabited by relatively backward people-Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Greece and Rome. Of course, many causes were involved, but it seems to me that two, perhaps, stand out. One was the importation of slaves from subject peoples, whose descendants in the passage of time became free and intermarried with their conquerors. Gibbon says of Rome: "The nation of soldiers, magistrates, and legislators, who composed the thirty five tribes of the Roman people, was dissolved into the common mass of mankind, and confounded with millions of servile provincials, who had received the name without adopting the spirit of Romans."

The other cause was perhaps this: In relatively simple societies where the dangers and hazards are mostly physical, are more easily understood and threaten all classes more or less alike, superior leadership is more easily recognized and more universally followed. As the nation grows and becomes more wealthy and more powerful, and its economy more differentiated and more tightly integrated, and economic natural law yields, to political pressures, where the greed of the masses offers unscrupulous leaders an opportunity to buy political support from the public purse, those constitutional bases—both written and unwritten—which made the nation great, are destroyed.

What made this nation great, of course, was our English inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon point of view, as embodied in the common law, and character, plus the discipline of conquering a wilderness, which eliminated the unfit and rewarded the fit. Our ancestors gave us a marvellous instrument in the Constitution. If they had added two things, we might have lasted longer. First, that if the legislatures of as many as three states declared that a decision of the Supreme Court in effect amended the Constitution, that decision should be null and void until affirmed by an amendment constitutionally adopted. Second, that if a citizen received in direct payments from the federal government more money than this citizen paid in taxes to the federal government, such citizen, except one elected to federal office, should lose his vote in federal elections as long as this condition existed.

Well, God moves in a mysterious way, and it may be that in His providence a way out of the current mess will be provided. Otherwise, I share

your pessimism.
Believe me, with best wishes,
Sincerely,
Henry P. Taylor

Henry P. Taylor Walkerton, Virginia

Editor
Virginia Record
Dear Mr. Dowdey:

Your Mr. Timothy Whitehead did a magnificent job in presenting the objectives and operation of the State Registration Board for Contractors in the feature articles in the September issue of the *Virginia Record*.

The opportunity to have such informative presentation disseminated through the media of the *Virginia Record* is appreciated by the Board.

Sincerely,
W. Albie Barksdale,
Chairman
State Registration
Board for Contractors,
Charlottesville, Virginia

Editor
Virginia Record
Dear Mr. Dowdey:

In your article "The Cruelest Moment" you have forcefully expressed what only a few know—man has not used history to avoid remaking mistakes and guard his liberties.

When the second part is published, I hope copies will be available that others than *Virginia Record* readers may read it. If copies are available please let it appear in the *Record*.

I hope you may have a hand in changing that old saying—ten percent of the people think, ten percent think they think, eighty percent are afraid they will think.

Sincerely, W. Judson King Norfolk, Virginia

Editor Virginia Record Dear Mr. Dowdey:

Always an admirer of good work, I now feel an expression is in order in relation to your series, "The Cruelest Moment," just concluded in the October issue of the *Virginia Record*. I only wish it were possible for a million or more people to read this splendid treatise.

Our thanks and good wishes are abundantly yours.

Sincerely,
Harold Anderson
Chief of Police, City of
Norfolk, Virginia



VIRGINIA BUSINESS REVIEW

FORTY-FOUR new plants were established in Virginia or announced their intention of establishing, during the first nine months of 1961. There were 54 expansions of existing industries during the same period.

The Virginia Department of Conservation and Economic Development made that announcement recently in releasing its third quarter report on manufacturing developments in the

C. M. Nicholson, Jr., Commissioner, Division of Industrial Development and Planning, added that the total new job opportunities arising from the new and expanding industries for the 9-months period are estimated at 3,250. This conservative estimate of new manpower requirements, Nicholson explained, reflects the fact that many of the new plants announced this year have been small-less than 100 employees-and some for which "initial employment" have been reported are pilot-plant operations, which will doubtlessly grow substantially over the next few years.

Moreover, an accurate picture of the new employment resulting from expansions of established firms is lacking because figures are available for only 31 of the 54 industries reported.

The third quarter report shows 12 new plants and 20 expansions of existing industries. Estimated employment by the new and expanded plants during

the quarter totals 1,000.

New plants and expansions during the quarter represent a wide variety of products, with the plants distributed fairly well geographically over the State. However, the Richmond area has been particularly favored in the past three months.

Some of the new firms are in the field of electronics. Apparel is represented along with food, furniture and paper products. Important expansions in production of plastic film have been announced by du Pont and Reynolds Metals, and smaller firms in many lines are adding to their floor space, equipment and employment.

The report is the result of a cooperative reporting system set up by the Virginia Division of Industrial Development and Planning and 19 other State agencies, public utilities and private development groups.

Arthur L. Clark, Personnel Manager,

has been elected Vice President by the Board of Directors of the Virginia Electric and Power Company at its regular meeting. He replaces H. Atwood Hitch, who retired December 1.

Clark, a native of Norfolk, joined Vepco in 1928. He attended the University of Richmond School of Business Administration prior to joining

the company.

He became District Accountant at Suffolk in 1936, and came to Richmond as Supervisor of General Accounting and Pay Roll in 1937. In 1945, he was appointed Chief Accountant, and in 1951, became Director of Auditing and Procedures. He was made Assistant Treasurer in 1953 and Personnel Director in 1956. He became Personnel Manager in 1958.

Clark is Vice Chairman of the Southeastern Electric Exchange's Employee Relations Committee, and a member of the Employee Relations Committee of the Edison Electric In-

He is a member of the Boulevard Methodist Church, at Richmond. where he serves as a member of the Finance Committee and the Official Board. He also is a past Chairman of the Board.

Knott Hotels Corporation, owners of the Thos. Jefferson Inn, has announced the appointment of Mrs. Bernard C. Fontana as general manager of the Inn and Mr. James Brackens as assistant

Mrs. Fontana has held various positions at the Inn since it opened in 1951 and has recently been assistant to the general manager. She was previously connected with the Union Club in Cleveland, Ohio and is a graduate of Michigan State University in East Lansing. Mrs. Fontana is the wife of Bernard C. Fontana, director of food services at the University of Virginia.

Mr. Brackens, 30, is a native of Covington and a 1958 graduate of the University of Virginia. He has resigned his position as a member of the public relations staff of Virginia Electric and Power Company in Richmond to join the staff of the Thos. Jefferson Inn.

Two promotions, effective December 1, have been announced by the Virginia Department of Highways. Donald E. Keith, a construction project engineer in the Fairfax Residency, was promoted to assistant resident engineer in the same residency; and Marvin Watkins, a district computer in the Petersburg Residency, was promoted to highway contract engineer in the Department's main office here.

Keith, 36, replaces W. R. Simpson, Jr., who resigned to become head of the Department of Public Works in the city of Fairfax. The new assistant resident engineer joined the Department in 1949 as an engineering aide in the Staunton District, and subsequently worked as a construction inspector in the Staunton, Salem, Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Culpeper Districts. In 1957, he was promoted to assistant resident engineer on construction (the title has since been changed to construction project engineer) in the Fairfax Residency.

Keith attended Randolph-Macon

Watkins, 44, will fill a newly created position in the Department's contract division. Employed in 1947 as a civil engineer in the Petersburg Residency, he has remained in the Richmond District, serving successfully as clerk, right-of-way agent, and district com-

Watkins is a veteran of World War II. He received his business training at Smithdeal-Massey in Richmond.

Paul A. Myers, manager of The Life Insurance Company of Virginia's data processing division, has been elected an assistant secretary of the company.

Myers, a native of Richmond, attended Benedictine High School and graduated from the University of Richmond in 1949. After serving two years with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's actuarial staff in New York, he joined Life of Virginia in 1955 as an actuarial trainee. Two years later he was named manager of the company's data processing unit.

Two Richmond investment firms-Thurston & Company and Hathaway Investment Company—have merged to form a new corporation, Thurston, Hathaway & Cecil, Inc.

William P. Thurston, Jr., founder and head of Thurston & Co., will serve as president of the new firm. Vice-presidents will be Robert M. Hathaway, former head of the Hathaway firm and John H. Cecil, Jr., formerly Thurston sales manager. Mrs. Martha W. Warriner will be secretary.

Thurston said the new company will specialize in financial planning and will offer complete brokerage facilities in both investment securities and life insurance—a new service in the area.

LONGSTREET CONTROVERSY

(from page 7)

allegedly advanced on the first day. His postwar accounts of his exchange with Lee do not coincide either with others' recollections or with Longstreet's own official report as submitted to Lee. Because of the lack of written orders, the confusion begins with Lee's intention.

In General Lee's official report, he stated: "The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which had arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the enemy the next morning; and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time."

General Lee reported, and Colonel Marshall and Colonel Long also stated, that Longstreet's dispositions "were not ready as soon as expected." Lee and his staff then rode to Longstreet's headquarters on the Confederate right, facing the Round Tops, and discovered that he had not prepared to execute the orders for attack. General Lee immediately sent orders to Ewell to withhold his cooperating attack on the Federal right; but Ewell's troops had become engaged before the countermanding orders arrived, and Ewell's attack was delivered alone.

According to Lee's report, and to the recollection of his staff officers, Longstreet explained that he "was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced." Colonel Long stated that Longstreet specifically mentioned the Union batteries on Little Round Top, and Long assured him they would be "suppressed." Colonel Marshall stated that Longstreet "again proposed that a movement should be made around the enemy's left. General Lee, however, decided that the attack should be made as ordered." From these accounts there would be nothing to infer that Longstreet "showed his want of confidence, or showed, as he said later, "I thought it (Lee's plan) would not do."

This general impression of the exchange is corroborated by Longstreet's official report, delivered to Lee's headquarters for endorsement. Referring to his staff, he reported, "Our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill (Little Round Top) occupied by the enemy on his left, and gain it by a flank and reverse attack." This revision of Lee's battle plan was no more than a reversion to the flank

attack urged by Hood and Law the day before, which Longstreet had overruled, and which had been made on a limited scale by Law.

With whatever disparity of details exists in the accounts, there is general agreement on the fact that Longstreet had not prepared to attack as Lee ordered, because of concern over the Federal troops on his right and potential flank, and, when Lee joined him, he suggested a tactical shift of his corps to a flanking movement around Little Round Top. There is nowhere a suggestion that he reverted to his alleged strategy for a movement made by the army away from Gettysburg alto-

Writing after Lee's death, however, Longstreet then stated that on the morning of the 3rd he still thought "General Lee might yet conclude to move around the Federal left. . . .

Note in the official report the words, to gain it by a flank and reverse attack, in referring to the enemy left at Little Round Top. Observe the subtle change of meaning in the post-war statement, to move around the Federal left. Here he shifted from his actual suggestion, as in his own endorsed report, from gaining the enemy's flank by attack to moving around the enemy's left. Yet, even in this first change, his suggestion still limited his proposal to the battle at Gettysburg.

In his later versions, when he began to develop the speeches he had made on the morning of the 3rd, he wrote, "Fearing that he (Lee) was still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him by saying, 'General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you will have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army and maneuver him into attacking us." (Not Longstreet's italics.)

Here he has gone from gaining the enemy's flank by attack of his own corps, as in his report, to a movement by the whole army which will maneuver the enemy into attacking them on some other field altogether. Since no one with Lee heard such a proposal, and as Longstreet himself did not state that he had made it until long after Lee was dead, it has to be counted among those retorts people wish they had made in some past event, and sometimes—as with Longstreet—actually get to believe it was said. By flatly contradicting his official report, Longstreet relates his third day's proposal to the line of his defensive strategy for the whole campaign.

As a matter of fact, the condition of the two armies makes it most unlikely that any professional soldier would declaim over the merits of a strategic movement which broke off an engagement to which the army was already committed. It would have been impossible for the Confederate forces to disengage themselves on a front from the viney boulders of Devil's Den to the rock masses of Culp's Hill four miles away-with miles of wagons leading back to Cashtown and thousands of wounded in field hospitals-to undertake a movement of maneuver to a new position, against an alert enemy on their front in possession of good roads. Such a movement would be so unthinkable that it is amazing historians have ever seriously considered Longstreet's strategic proposals in the Controversy. The opinion here is that the relative strategies in the arguments are an element that did not actually exist at Gettysburg.

Though Longstreet, by record, preferred a movement to Meade's left as opposed to Lee's two-pronged drives against the enemy's flanks, this was purely a matter of ground tactics. Longstreet's slowness made it impossible for "concert of action" to be achieved between the Confederate right and Ewell on the left, with the result that on the second and third days the two corps attacked separately and Hill, in the center, never faced a stretching of enemy strength which he could exploit. The consequences of Longstreet's actions removed even the appearance of Lee's designs from the battle, and totally nullified the gallant work of the Second Corps troops on the Federal right. But Lee's design and the performances of the Second and Third Corps come into focus the moment the obscuring cloud of Longstreet's strategy is disposed of.

There remains only Longstreet's fantastic claim that Lee should have placed

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Donald K. Muhleman, Notary Public. (My commission expires October 19, 1963.)

another in command of the third day assault, or supervised it personally, because he knew of his subordinate's disapproval. The composite versions of Lee's staff and of Longstreet on the meeting of the morning of July 3 makes it clear that Longstreet's opposition—like his strategy—was in his own mind. That it was in his mind there is no question, but it is extremely doubtful that he made known "a want of confidence." It is inconceivable that the assertion of such a state of mind could have gone unnoticed by all observers.

As previously mentioned, it was nothing new for Longstreet to delay going into action and to make counter tactical suggestions. All the evidence indicates that Lee and his staff officers regarded his proposals and slowness to move as characteristic. Since no one knew of the inner conflict agitating Longstreet, Lee had no reason to suspect that, once prodded into action, the deliberate Dutchman would renounce all responsibilities for the pro-

jected assault of July 3.

Longstreet appears to be clearer in mind about his dereliction on the more publicized third day than on the crucial second. The fight on the second was waged among the thickets and the boulders on the far right of the line, with the details-and those fragmentary-known only to the surviving participants. The scene of the famed charge was in the center of both lines, in open country across which the assault columns moved like figures in an amphitheatre, and voluminous details were supplied by observers who were not participants in the actual engagement. Against the weight of evidence it was impossible for Longstreet even to attempt to gloss over his balky refusal to assume responsibility for the

Because of Longstreet's protests over using the divisions of Hood and Mc-Laws, they remained in position on the right. The assault force was formed of Pickett's three fresh brigades and six brigades from the divisions of Heth and Pender in Hill's Corps; from Anderson's division, Wilcox was to support Pickett on the right, and Wright and Perry were to move out, with artillery, in immediate support of the attacking lines.

As it happened in Hill's Corps, both Heth and Pender were out wounded (the devout Pender mortally), and temporary commanders were in charge. Receiving no supervision from Longstreet, Pickett's three brigades and Hill's six brigades moved out separately, with Hill's brigades poorly arranged and the weakest brigade on the flank. Wilcox did not move out to support Pickett's right, but went in—in response to

urgent calls from Pickett—after the assault had failed and the attacking force was falling back. Wright and Perry were not moved out at all. The supporting artillery had only a few solid shots in the caissons.

All these elements were matters of full record, and that they were chargeable to Longstreet's mulish negligence was substantiated by (then) Colonel Alexander, the acting chief of First Corps Artillery to whom Longstreet turned over the decision of ordering the assault. Brilliant young Alexander kept a copy of every message sent to and received from Longstreet during the unprecedented behavior of a corps commander shifting to a field officer in his twenties the responsibility of a combined infantry assault.

In knowledge that these details of his shirking could not be explained away, Longstreet went to the extreme of charging Lee with failure to direct the troops and the batteries of the assault force because he knew of Longstreet's "want of confidence." Then, to justify his want of confidence, he erected the postwar structure of his defensive strategy.

As mentioned before, since insubordinate conduct for whatever reason is a grievous offense in an officer of any



rank—and as Longstreet himself later used McLaws' alleged "want of confidence" as an excuse for dismissing him from command—obviously Longstreet would build a case on his own want of confidence, and its resulting rejection of the responsibilities of command, only to hide something worse. The "worse" was the actual performance in which, because of his own agitation, he violated the trust placed in him by the commanding general, his brother officers and his soldiers.

The long controversy over the various superficial aspects, in beclouding the real issues, has caused the neglect of a study of the character of the man who suffered such inner disturbance. Part of the difficulty in Longstreet's case has been a tendency to regard him -as well as most prominent Civil War generals-in a light which removes shadows and shadings from a portrait. He must be seen to stand, four-square, forever, as one immutable quality. This quality in Longstreet was suggested by the soubriquet, "Lee's War Horse"-the stalwart, dependable, unchanging in all circumstance. This can not be true of Longstreet any more than of any other human being.

As a soldier, Longstreet was well trained, highly competent and very brave. In battle, he had a stubborn determination and unruffled coolness that usually made his presence reassuring in the hottest action. At his best, he ranked on performance with the best division commanders in the war and he boasted a high average of being at his best. But, like most other generals of both sides, he was not always at his best.

Lee's most ardent admirers admit he commanded a poor battle at Malvern Hill and that Gettysburg was not among his inspired battles. Part of the reason in the Gettysburg Campaign may have been that the successive failures in his subordinates, beginning with Stuart, shook his poise. Yet, he is not minimized by a frank admission that his army lacked a strong controlling hand at Gettysburg.

Stonewall Jackson has been castigated for a century for inadequacies charged against him during the Seven Days; A. P. Hill, Ewell, Jubal Early, all the corps commanders in Lee's Army experienced bad days which none of them ever tried to explain away.

There is nothing against Longstreet's character as a man nor his reputation as a general to charge that he, among others, performed poorly at Gettysburg. Jeb Stuart's reputation remains undimmed by the blight of Gettysburg on his record.

All of this comes back to Longstreet's compulsion to explain his conduct at Gettysburg by shifting the blame to Lee. There was something in him that did not fit the image of the "War Horse," of the old dependable who could do no wrong, and this is what he felt the need to hide.

This inner strain, which conflicted with the public image, did not begin and end at Gettysburg. In fact, the Controversy over Gettysburg tended to remove Longstreet in that battle from the context of his war career. Once Longstreet is placed within the context of his total war career, his behavior at Gettysburg immediately ceases to be a contradiction of the changeless image of the "War Horse."

At the Battle of Seven Pines, May 31-June 1, 1862, when Joe Johnston commanded the army in Virginia, Longstreet behaved as irrationally as at Gettysburg and, as at Gettysburg, found a scapegoat for his own failings. Seven Pines does not loom as large as Gettysburg nor Huger as Lee, and no controversy ever developed over Longstreet at Seven Pines. Yet, the record is complete, and very revealing. It shows Seven Pines to be a highlight of Longstreet's blundering on an off-

day—which all of his defenders have avoided, apparently on the reasoning that if they did not call attention no one would notice it.

To begin with, he moved to the wrong road, Williamsburg instead of Nine Mile, for the assault under his supervision. In moving to the Williamsburg Road, his troops reached the Gillies Creek crossing at the same time as Huger's three brigades. Due to a tremendous downpour of the night before, the creek was high and several hours would be required for the crossing. By Johnston's orders, the assault was to open as early after daylight as possible, and the attack would be made when the first of Huger's brigades made juncture with Rodes' Brigade, of Hill's Division, on the Charles City Road. Huger, on whose appearance the early opening depended, was held up at the creek while Longstreet's six brigades crossed.

Then, when Longstreet's Division had reached the Williamsburg Road, the long line of six brigades halted and pulled off the road to allow Huger to pass. In his report, Longstreet stated that at eight o'clock his troops were deployed for battle, but the action had to be held up until tardy Huger brought his brigades forward.

After being allowed to pass, Huger proceeded on his line of march to the Charles City Road, made contact with Rodes, whose brigades rushed crosscountry to the Williamsburg Road, and Hill's Division launched its locally successful attack on Casey's Redoubt. While Hill's four brigades were driving the enemy, Longstreet sent three of his six brigades down the Charles City Road behind Huger. Then Longstreet sent orders for Huger to halt and allow Longstreet's brigades to move in advance. This was done. Then orders came for Longstreet's three brigades to countermarch and return toward the Williamsburg Road. This was done. Then they were sent back down the Charles City Road, behind Huger. Finally, they were ordered crosscountry to support Hill. They arrived when the battle was about over, and took no significant part. In his report, Longstreet explained the absence of half his division in the battle by claiming that he needed to support Hugerthough Huger was never seriously en-





gaged on his front.

Of the six brigades in his own division, Longstreet got in only one, fully committed, and this after one of Hill's four was dropping out. With 13 brigades at his command, Longstreet used five. Holding to the narrow front opened by the good fighter Hill around Seven Pines, Longstreet sent his first message of the day to Johnston at four in the afternoon when he asked for help on the left. In his report, he stated that he needed this help to "complete his victory" because of Huger's failure to support on the right. Huger was precisely where he should have been, followed his orders, and was in no way involved with Longstreet's leaving the left open while five of his own brigades were either held out of action or went in too late to take a decisive part.

Huger was not a distinguished soldier, had few supporters in high places, and his demand for a court of inquiry was shunted about without any action taken. However, Longstreet showed with Huger as later with Lee the compulsion to twist the facts and make out a good case for himself at another's expense.

Then, after Gettysburg, when Longstreet finally achieved his ambition of independent command, his siege of Knoxville was a campaign of conspicuous ineptitude. There he tried to shift the blame on McLaws with the trumped up charge of McLaws' "want of confidence" in the commanding general's plans. McLaws demanded a court martial, which cleared him. Longstreet also turned on Jerome Robertson, in command of Hood's old Texas Brigade, and hounded him out of the army. He placed Evander Law under arrest and entered such fantastic charges against him that the President stepped in and informed Longstreet that the war department "refused to entertain" the charges against Law.

This sort of behavior does not at all fit the image of the dependable War Horse. It does represent a part of Long-

street's character as consistent in its appearance as his stout qualities as a fighter once he was ready. Obviously a man can be a fine combat soldier, with reassuring presence on the battle-field, and at the same time be disturbed by inner conflicts.

The source of Longstreet's disturbance was an ambition for higher command. The records are very clear on his efforts to detach himself from Lee and, as at the miserable siege of Suffolk, essay independent command. Though all of his strategic suggestions reveal his limitations as a military thinker, he fancied himself as a strategist and was unwilling to be merely a subordinate — or anybody's "War Horse." Longstreet's ambitions were manifest from the first letters he wrote the war department, over promotion, in 1861.

After he was wounded out of the army on May 6, 1864, during the second day of the Wilderness, Longstreet did not return until October, when the mobility of the Army of Northern Virginia was lost and the declining troops were settled to withstand a state of siege. With strategies and movements all in the past, with a hard core of survivors enduring to the end, Longstreet then showed himself at his very best. As if his own dreams of glories were then abandoned, he performed during the last months as the stout dependable of the image and that was the impression he left on his time.

This impression expressed a valid part of Longstreet, but so did the disturbing ambition, which produced the jealousy that forced him to the end to derogate Jackson. The two parts were always there and the split was revealed most openly at Gettysburg. If Seven Pines and Knoxville are borne in mind when the Gettysburg Controversy is studied, Longstreet—anything except a dependable as a self-witness—will be seen to be acting in a consistent pattern with the less noble aspect in ascendance.

Here is a final note to be entered on his claims over his strategy—and his strategic ambitions. While his two ventures in independent command were gruesome failures, Lee's military masterpiece at Chancellorsville was fought when Longstreet and two of his divisions were absent; and Lee's greatest campaign, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, was fought when Longstreet was present only one half of one day. On this record, in all truth, how could the strategic claims of the good combat soldier ever have been taken seriously?

(This is the last of four consecutive articles on the controversy surrounding Longstreet in the Gettysburg Campaign).



The Epicurean Delights of Christmas

(Continued from page 6)



of Old England, an early recipe for the cooking of a turkey has survived, emerging from the pantry of one of the old manors. It runs:

"Draw your turkey then, having shred sweet herbs, put them in a linen bag with butter and spices. Then put them in the belly of the turkey roast it, baste it with butter, drudge it with flour and serve it up with anchovy sauce garnished with slices of lemon."

To consider the Wassail Bowl and liquid refreshment, which in bygone days helped to assimilate the extraordinary demands on the human system, is to run the whole gamut of the wine list. There were different vintages for each course, heavy stouts, barley ales, to say nothing of the post-prandial liqueurs offered as gastronomic aids. And so a minstrel of the day sang to his lute:

Lordling Christmas loves good drinking

Wines of Gascoigne, France, Anjou,

English ale that drowns out thinking

Prince of liquors old and new Every neighbor shares the bowl Drinks of the spicy liquor deep Drinks his fill without control 'Till he drowns his care in sleep.

Coming closer to home, the oyster in Virginia has always been given a high place for seasonal eating, being often used for stuffing the turkey. The oyster for many years was "the dish" for the colored people who served it with spoon bread. In George Washington's time, the stuffed capon was *de rigueur* as was a baron of beef and a saddle of lamb.

Martha Washington was particularly proud of her Christmas cake, but few modern chatelaines would feel equal to her venture because her recipe called for 40 eggs, "frensch" brandy, five pounds of flour and five pounds of sugar.

George Washington was equally proud (and even a little cagey about letting other people have it) of his mixture of Christmas egg-nog. It has, however, come down to posterity and

calls for:

One quart of milk
One quart of cream
One dozen eggs
One dozen teaspoonsful of sugar
One pint of brandy
Half pint of rye liquor
Quarter of a pint of Jamaica rum
Quarter of a pint of sherry.

"How the Union Was Reunited With the Confederacy"

(Continued from page 3)

brought the religious faith to the continent.

Then, you come to the Revolution, which was presumably fought and won by the Minute Men at Concord when they "fired the shot heard round the world." It was not heard even as far as Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress, in session long before the supposedly explosive shot, went right on debating like any good committee which refuses to be diverted from its agenda. In all truth, the committees of the Continental Congress were the "Minute Men" of the Revolution. They finally talked themselves into taking a stand against England.

Somehow the valiant farmers at "Concord Bridge" have overshadowed the facts that the big men at the Congress which declared for independence were Virginians, like Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Harrison, and the man sent to Boston to handle the trouble stirred up by the local "patriots" was another Virginian, Washington.

After the skirmish at Bunker Hill, you can search in vain for battles in Pilgrim-land. All the serious fighting took place between New York and Georgia, bearing heavily on the Carolinas and Virginia. The clever Northern historians know how to get around this without effort. They simply say Paul Revere over and over, point to the statue of the Minute Man, and who thinks about good Pilgrim Benedict Arnold bringing the sword and torch to plantations and the city of

Richmond as he led foreign troops through Virginia?

What school child could accurately identify the battles at Harlem, Princeton, the Brandywine, Guilford Court House, the Paoli massacre or Tarleton's raid on Monticello? And what child could not immediately give the Northern poet's version of Paul Revere?—who accomplished nothing at all. Can even Virginia school children identify Jack Jouett, whose perilous ride actually did save Jefferson?

Now, Colonel Beauregard Horsepasture has shown us that our slavery to facts is one of the most dangerous symptoms of our backwardness. At the hour when we seemed about to lose the Centennial as well as the war, the way to progress, to true enlightened progressiveness, has been revealed. Southern history must be emancipated from the bondage of facts.

It is obvious that our mistake all along has been to use documentary proof in arguments. Southerners have been traditionally great constitutionalists, and it has been difficult for them to accept—even after the Civil War and the current Supreme Court—that nobody cares about constitutionalities. Call Lincoln "The Great Emancipator" and the Court's decision "the law of the land," and these tags, not facts, become the historic realities to everyone except the benighted Southerners. The Centennial is the time to change all that.

For a while we despaired that the

Centennial would fail of its national purpose to promote the study of the truths, the facts, about the costly division in the American nation. Though it is now plain that hope for such a purpose was delusory, it is not too late to catch on to the way things work in the nation. It probably is too late to hope for much for the generations who have completed their formal education (a charitable expression used to describe the American habit of deadening the mind after finishing enforced schooling). But now is the time to begin on the rising generations at the level of textbooks and recommended printed matter, along with various slogans which could be adopted by mass media-such as newspapers, television, and radio-and placed at centers of travel as well as at historic sites.

Following the simple approach used by Colonel Horsepasture, we should adhere to the single line that America was founded in Virginia and that America exists today only in Virginia and the other ten states-referring to the sister states of the Confederacy. The vast territories north of the Potomac and west of the Mississippi merely represent a foreign people with whom, for supposedly mutual benefits, we operate in a compact of union, much as England admits Australia into its commonwealth. We extend to the peoples of this appendage to our America the courtesy of loosely calling them "Americans," though the Hawaiians

and the Massachusetters are no more truly Americans to us than the bushmen of Australia are truly British.

We originally entered this compact for a complex of reasons, more paternalistic than wise. After the Pilgrims had gotten themselves into all that trouble by smuggling (so that merchants could grow rich by evading British import taxes) and by mob action against legitimate tea importers, the Virginians, with typical generosity, pulled the Pilgrims' chestnuts out of the fire for them, though its ruling class was impoverished in so doing. After Washington, R. E. Lee's father, and hundreds of other Virginians and Confederate-Americans had defeated the British and won independence, the English Parliament voted to give the Northern territories their freedom too: if England couldn't have the Confederate-Americans in the Empire, she did not want the others.

Cast off by the British, the Pilgrims petitioned the Americans to enter a compact of union with them, as they felt unable to go it alone. There was strong opposition to this in America, where many old-line planters felt suspicious of the foreigners. Washington's prestige and Madison's adroitness in political maneuver were required to win a narrow vote of approval for the compact against the opposition of such Revolutionary leaders as Patrick Henry and Benjamin Harrison-the latter predicting dire consequences of a partnership with the foreigners whom he had gotten to know during the Revolution. (Though this is a fact, it has been a well-kept secret for so long it isn't likely to get out and enter a

distorting note.) The ink was hardly dry on the Articles of Union before the foreigners began to show their intent of taking economic advantage of the Americans. As industrialists and traders, they wanted to buy cheap and sell dear, and one of their most profitable operations was capturing Negroes in Africa and selling them as slaves to planters. However, once out of the British system, the 11 American states began to turn against the institution of slavery and forced the Northerners to accept a new law which forbade the further selling of human chattels. This made the slave dealers awful mad, being hurt in purse, and they retaliated by forming the NAASP-the Northern Association for the Abolition of Southerners' People.

They formed clubs of "Freedom Writers," who developed propaganda mills in the northernmost territories, where they would have least contact with Americans and, hence, be the least influenced by facts. They incited

"Hit-down Strikes"—the slaves to hit people on the head with axes—as was well executed by Nat Turner's followers when they killed 55 men, women and children in Southampton County.

But the Americans refused to be bullied. From Virginia to Texas, they said in effect, "No matter what trouble you make in our country, we will never reopen the slave trade. As it happens, we are even now manumitting those we have." Then the American leaders made a fateful mistake. Virginians and North Carolinians produced facts to prove that the institution of slavery was doomed in those states, and it was only a matter of time before the other nine American states would follow the same course. This tactical mistake was soon used against them.

By 1860, when the compact was only 71 years old, the Americans decided that the Virginia opponents of the whole union idea had been right in the first place. Besides, in those 70 years, the Northern territories had been taking in more and more foreign people, and the North had become less American than ever. The original American states decided that, all things considered, the compact with the territories on the continent was continued at too high a cost—in economics, in peace of mind, in everything. The other people were just too foreign for any harmonious union to be achieved.

As soon as the 11 American states dissolved the union, the Northern territories - who, until then, hadn't had a good word to say about their partner-in-compact — suddenly decided they could not go on without America. Being a people of shrewd traders, they were very rich in gold, and they paid hundreds of thousands of men, drawing from all over the globe, to help bring the American states back into the alliance by force. They were also mechanical minded, and they spent millions on the biggest guns ever before seen and fired these into the American cities. This was also when they skillfully used the tactical mistakes made by the Virginians.

As facts had shown that the institution of slavery was passing (forever dooming the Pilgrim slave traders to loss of income by selling human chattels), the Northern territorials came out with a slogan of "freeing" the slaves, and went so far as to proclaim that the Americans were fighting—not to be shed of their foreign allies—but in order to take slavery into the North! Thus, while the Americans were actually fighting to stay out of a compact with people who wanted to go on selling slaves, the Northerners made it

appear that their mercenaries were fighting to keep the Americans from bringing the competition of slave labor into the North.

As soon as their soldiers invaded the American states, they saw they had been told lies and went home. But the gold was limitless and the Northern insurgent government could always pay others to come: also inducements were offered to pyromaniacs, who could burn all the houses they wanted; to jewel collectors and silver fanciers and apprentice hoodlums.

By these means, of course, they could not defeat a freedom loving people, who had already defeated Great Britain twice. But against the American patriots many of the mercenaries (especially the Hessians) would desert the Northern hordes, and these deserters became a menace by preying on the families whose men were away with General Lee. Finally, when a fifth year of the stalemate began, the 11 American states decided that if the Northern people wanted to get back in the alliance that much, the simplest thing to do would be to let them in-though definitely without any slave buying from the Pilgrim slavers. On this sticky point a compromise was reached.

During the war a renegade American, Abraham Lincoln (whose people came from Virginia) had issued a Proclamation as part of the propaganda to frighten Northern manufacturers of the possible competition of slave labor. To save face all around, it was agreed to let the Northern insurgents have credit for ending the institution of slavery; otherwise the insurgent leader would look a big liar and a basis laid for future misunderstandings. In exchange for no more agitation from the Pilgrim slavers, the Americans were willing to let Lincoln take any credit he needed. After all, they thought, history would have the facts.

Then, as we now know, the Northerners wrote the history without facts, and for three generations the truth has not been known. Though we have been somewhat slow in finding a means to combat this history of reiteration of non-facts, let us begin with this Centennial to tell *our* truths, so that when the next Centennial comes, all the generations then alive will know the story of the eleven American states.

Clifford Dowdey



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